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JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a decree of divorce entered in the
Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County, State of Utah, on
October 26, 1989.
1989.

The Notice of Appeal was filed on November 24,

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal

pursuant to Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure and Utah Code Ann., § 78-2a-3 (2) (h) (Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Although Mr. Homer seeks to complicate this appeal by
listing multiple issues, there are really only three:
1.

Whether the court abused its discretion in awarding

permanent alimony to Mrs. Homer.
2.

Whether the court abused its discretion in calculating

Mr. Homer's child support obligation.
3.

Whether the court abused its discretion in its division

of the parties' marital assets and in its award of pension
benefits to Mrs. Homer.
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
Determinative authority is included in the addendum to this
brief and by reference made a part hereof.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Mrs. Kathe Homer, the Plaintiff-Respondent in this case,
filed a complaint on September 11', 1987, against her husband, the
Defendant-Appellant, seeking a decree of divorce, sole custody of

the parties1 minor child, alimony, child support, a fair and
equitable division of the real and personal property, and
attorney's fees.

The case was tried before the Honorable Ray M.

Harding for one day on July 13, 1989.
Each side was represented by counsel and presented
documentary evidence, as well as their own testimonies.

In

addition, Mr. Homer presented testimony of three witnesses,
including Randy Marchant and Maxine Shick, who testified as to
social security and pension benefits.
The court issued its Memorandum Decision on July 31, 1989,
(R. 23 4) a copy of which is attached to Mr. Homer's primary
brief.

The plaintiff's attorney, Richard Johnson, submitted

proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, decree of
divorce and qualified domestic relations order (hereinafter
"QDRO") on August 23, 1989.
Thereafter, Mr. Homer, acting as his own attorney, filed a
motion for reconsideration (R. 303) and objection to the proposed
qualified domestic relations order.

(R. 314)

Contemporaneously

therewith, Mr. Homer submitted his own supplemental findings of
fact, conclusions of law and decree of divorce.

(R. 381)

In a subsequent Memorandum Decision, filed on October 25,
1989, (R. 294) the court considered Mr. Homer's objections. (R.
268)

Where the court granted those objections, it interlineated

the necessary changes on the documents prepared by Mrs. Homer's
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counsel, and the decree of divorce was entered on October 26,
1989. (R. 324)

The court denied all other objections and all

other arguments for reconsideration.
of appeal on November 24, 1989.

Mr. Homer filed his notice

(R. 324)

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Plaintiff-Respondent, Mrs. Kathe Homer, and the
Defendant-Appellant, Mr. Stephen Homer, were married on August
13, 1980.

(R. 1)

One child was born as issue of this marriage,

Melissa Ann Homer, on July 17, 1981. (R. 2)
trial, she was eight years old.

At the time of

In addition, Mrs. Homer had two

children from a previous marriage, Ben and Peter, who at time of
trial were 21 and 19 respectively.

(Tr. 39-40).

At time of trial Mrs. Homer was employed as a library
technician by the City of Orem, and had gross earnings of
$1,673.00 per month.

(R. 291). Mr. Homer is a licensed attorney

practicing law in the State of Utah.

At time of trial he was

employed by the City of West Jordan, and his gross income was
$3,627.00 per month.

(R. 291).

The parties reached a stipulation on the division of all
personal property except for the value of the parties' two
automobiles and the division of Mr. Homer's pension benefits.

At

trial, the court found that the value of the marital assets
awarded to each party was close enough that no offset for the
values of the vehicles in each party's possession was required as
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part of the overall equitable property settlement.

(R. 285)

As

to pension benefits, the court ordered that each party was
entitled to one-half of all retirement programs accrued during
the course of the marriage.

(R. 288)

The court rejected the

defendant's argument that a portion of his pension benefits were
exempt from division because they are a substitute for social
security benefits and social security would be exempt by federal
law in this case as the marriage was less than 10 years.

(R.

288)
The court awarded Mrs. Homer sole custody of the parties'
minor child, and ordered Mr. Homer to pay child support in the
amount of $404.95 per month.

(R. 287)

The court attached a copy

of the Child Support Obligation Worksheet to the Decree of
Divorce.

(R. 290)

The court further found that Mrs. Homer pays

ongoing child care of $140.00 per month and that the defendant
was obligated pursuant to prior court order to pay $200.00 per
month as child support to the children of his prior marriage.
(R. 287)

All such amounts were considered in the worksheet

calculations (R. 290-293) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

Mr. Homer's appellate brief does not comply with the

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The facts are not cited to

the record, and the arguments are not supported by law.

In fact,

many arguments are contrary to well-established case law and
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express statute.

In addition, Mr, Homer's brief is burdensome,

full of irrelevant and immaterial information and an abuse of the
appellate process.

It should be stricken, and Mrs. Homer should

be awarded her costs and fees for the necessity of defending
against it.
2.

The lower court's award of permanent alimony in the

amount of $150.00 per month is consistent with the evidence
presented at trial and the court's findings.

The award should be

affirmed.
3.

Mr. Homer's child support obligation was correctly

calculated pursuant to the Uniform Civil Liability for Support
Act.

Mr. Homer was given credit where appropriate for the child

support ordered to be paid for the children of his prior
marriage; the consideration of tax consequences is built into the
child support tables; he presented no evidence at trial that an
award to him of the dependency exemption would be in the best
economic interest of the parties; and Mr. Homer has a statutory
right to reduce his child support payments when work-related
child support costs are no longer being incurred.

Therefore, the

child support order should be affirmed in all respects.
4.

The lower court's award of personal property, including

pension benefits, was not an abuse of discretion.

Instead, the

assets were correctly valued at the time of divorce.

The trial

court has discretion to award pension benefits based upon a

5

percentage, and all such benefits acquired by both parties during
a marriage are subject to division as marital assets.

The trial

court correctly denied Mr. Homer an offset for amounts paid in
support of his stepchildren during the parties1 marriage.
Therefore, the personal property division should be affirmed in
all respects.
ARGUMENT
I
MOTION TO STRIKE AND FOR AWARD OF
ATTORNEYS1 FEES
Mrs. Homer respectfully moves this Court to strike Mr.
Homer's Appellate Brief and to award her costs and attorneyfs
fees expended in the necessity of defending against that brief
pursuant to Rules 24 and 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
Pursuant to Rule 24 (k), all briefs must be "concise,
presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings
and free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous
matters."

The rule goes on to provide that "briefs which are not

in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua
sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees
against the offending lawyer."
Pursuant to Rule 33, a party is entitled to an award for its
damages if the court determines that an appeal is frivolous.
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These damages may include single or double costs and/or
reasonable attorneys1 fees to the prevailing party.
These rules are directly applicable to this case.

Mr.

Homer's brief does not comply with the Rules of Appellate
Procedure in the following respects:
1.

Contrary to Rule 24(e), Mr. Homer has completely failed

to make any citation to the record in his brief.
statement of facts is unsupported.

Therefore, his

Although Mr. Homer cites case

law, he rarely uses it to support his position.

Instead, Mr.

Homer uses the brief as a forum to attempt to relitigate factual
issues based upon his interpretation of equity.

Many of these

positions are contrary to well established case law and statute.
Therefore, his positions are "not grounded in fact, not warranted
by existing law, and not based on a good faith argument to
extend, modify, or reverse existing law" as required by Rule
33(b) .
In only one example among many, Mr. Homer argues that it is
somehow unconstitutional to award permanent alimony in a
contested, no-fault divorce over his objection.

There is simply

no basis in law for this position, and the fact that Mr. Homer is
an attorney makes this abuse of the appellate process even more
egregious.
2.

Looking strictly to the form of the brief, it is a

burdensome and irrelevant stream-of-consciousness rendition of
Mr. Homer's self-serving view of fairness.
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Further, Mr. Homer

makes scandalous allegations, among others, that Mrs. Homer was
never committed to the marriage and that she intentionally
delayed this matter so as to increase the benefits to which she
would be entitled upon divorce.
merit or basis.

Such allegations are without

Mr. Homer goes so far as to mock the judicial

system by implying that a judge's personal experience in his or
her marriage is the primary influence on a judge in his or her
decision to award alimony.

Again, Mr. Homer's position as an

officer of the court makes the allegations particularly
offensive.
Based on the foregoing, Mrs. Homer moves this Court to
strike Mr. Homer's brief and to award her judgment for her costs
and attorney's fees incurred by the necessity of defending
against it.
II
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
AWARDING ALIMONY TO MRS. HOMER

IN

Mr. Homer argues that the lower court failed to make
adequate findings to support its award of alimony and that the
award of permanent alimony was an abuse of discretion.

In

addition, Mr. Homer submits a lengthy monologue arguing that the
award of alimony is unconstitutional in two respects.
First, he argues that the court cannot award alimony in a
no-fault divorce over the objection of the paying spouse.
Second, he argues that historically only women have received
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alimony, and therefore the award is discriminatory.
Although he makes these assertions, Mr. Homer cites no legal
authority for his arguments and both are unsupported by law and
in fact.

Instead, the concept of fault in a divorce is

irrelevant to an award of alimony.

This principle was outlined

by the Utah Supreme Court in Read v. Read, 594 P.2d 871 (Utah
1979) .

In that case, the Supreme Court ruled that fault should

not be used in setting alimony or dividing property to impose a
punishment upon either party.

The standard was articulated in

the case of Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P.2d 144 (Utah 1978) wherein
the Utah Supreme Court stated that:
The purpose of alimony is to provide
post-marital support; it is intended neither
as a penalty imposed on the husband nor as a
reward granted to the wife. Its function is
to provide support for the wife as nearly as
possible at the standard of living she
enjoyed during the marriage and to prevent
her from becoming a public charge. Important
criteria in determining a reasonable award
for support and maintenance are the financial
conditions and needs of the wife, considering
her station in life; her ability to produce
sufficient income for herself; and the
ability of the husband to provide support.
Id. at 147. (quoting English v. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah
1977)).
Therefore, the grounds for each divorce, regardless of their
severity, are irrelevant to the court's determination of alimony.
Mr. Homer's argument that it is unconstitutional to award alimony
in a no-fault divorce is unsupportable.
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The second aspect of Mr. Homer's unconstitutionality
argument, that an award of alimony is discriminatory, is likewise
absurd.
claim.

Mr. Homer cites no facts or legal authority for his
Instead, more women than men have been awarded alimony

for the simple fact that women have not historically been
financially self-supporting.

Therefore, the case law reflects

the reality of women's roles in the work force.
Turning to the issues which are relevant to an award of
alimony, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this
case.

The Utah courts have established three factors which must

be considered by the trial court in making an alimony award, and
such an award will not be overturned on appeal absent a manifest
abuse of discretion.

As recently outlined by the Utah Court of

Appeals in Qsguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 131 Utah Adv. Rptr. 21
(March 19, 1990) :
Trial courts have broad discretion in
awarding alimony. We will not disturb the
trial court's alimony award so long as the
trial court exercises its discretion within
the standards set by the court. In
determining alimony, the trial court must
consider three factors: 1) the financial
conditions and needs of the receiving spouse;
2) the ability of the receiving spouse to
produce a sufficient income for him or
herself; and 3) the ability of the responding
spouse to provide support. If the trial
court considers these factors, this court
will not disturb the alimony award unless
such a serious inequity has resulted as to
manifest clear abuse of discretion.
Id. at 22.

(citing Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647 (Utah 1988) and
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Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 (Utah App. 1989)).
Applying these factors to the case on appeal, it is clear
that the court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning a
support award for Mrs. Homer.

To begin with, the court found

that Mrs. Homer was employed as a library technician by the City
of Orem, with a gross monthly income of $1,673.00. (R. 291)

The

court also found that Mr. Homer is a licensed attorney practicing
law in the state of Utah and that his gross monthly income was
$3,627.00.

(R. 291)

Evidence before the court established that

Mrs. Homer's expenses totalled $1,706.56. (R. 114)

These facts

are set forth in the findings of fact as follows:

14. . . . The court finds that the
defendant has a monthly income of $3,627 and
that the plaintiff has an income of $1,673. .
16. The court finds that the plaintiff
is in need of alimony and the defendant has
the ability to pay the same and, accordingly,
the defendant is ordered to pay to the
plaintiff the sum of $150.00 per month as
alimony payable in two equal monthly payments
on the 5th and 20th of each month commencing
July 19, 1989.
Mr. Homer argues that these are insufficient findings of
fact to support the trial court's award of alimony.

Contrary to

this assertion, the findings are adequate in light of the fact
that there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to make a
proper determination of alimony, including expenses and earnings
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of both parties.

Therefore, any lack of additional findings is

not fatal on appeal.

As this court stated in Boyle v. Boyle, 735

P.2d 669 (Utah App. 1989):
This Court concurs in the Supreme Court's
reflection that more detailed findings on
each required factor would assist in the
appellate process. However, we find as did
the Supreme Court in Paffel, that 'the
evidence in this case supports the lower
court's order and appellant has made no
showing to rebut the presumption that the
trial court did consider respondent's income,
expenses and need for support.'
Id. at 671-72.

(quoting Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 102 (Utah

1986)).
Finally, Mr. Homer argues that it was an abuse of discretion
to award Mrs. Homer permanent alimony.

Both the Utah Supreme

Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have held that permanent
alimony should be awarded after a long-term marriage.

(See Jones

v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985); Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564
(Utah 1985); Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988) and
Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988)).
Although the courts have not defined what constitutes a
long-term marriage, the Utah Supreme Court in Davis v. Davis, 749
P.2d 647 (Utah 1988) upheld an award of permanent alimony in the
sum of $750.00 per month after a 13-year marriage.

In the Davis

case, the Court pointed out that the trial judge had considered
the three factors necessary.

The Court stated:

All three factors must be considered, and the
ultimate test of the propriety of an alimony
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award is whether, given all of these factors,
the party receiving alimony will be able to
support him-or herself 'as nearly as possible
at the standard of living . . . enjoyed
during the marriage.1
Id. at 649.

(quoting Jones, 700 P.2d at 1075, and English v.

English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977)).

The Utah Supreme Court

went on to compare each parties' income after the payment of
alimony to determine that Mr. Davis "can afford the alimony
awarded and is left with ample resources to provide himself with
what is very likely to be a far more luxurious living standard
than [his wife] will enjoy."

Davis, 749 P.2d at 649.

These principles are directly applicable to Mr. Homer's
appeal.

The trial court only awarded Mrs. Homer the minimal sum

of $150.00 per month in alimony.

Coupled with the child support

of $404.95, Mrs. Homer's total income with the award of alimony
is still significantly less than Mr. Homer's income.

Mr. Homer

is left with ample resources to provide for himself, and the
court's award to Mrs. Homer of $150.00 per month was not an abuse
of discretion.

It should be upheld on appeal.
Ill

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN CALCULATING MR. HOMER'S CHILD SUPPORT
OBLIGATION
In his appeal of his child support obligation, Mr. Homer
alleges three errors.
The first error is defined by Mr. Homer as a failure of the
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trial court to consider the income tax consequences of the order.
Mrs. Homer asserts that what Mr. Homer really means is that the
court erred in not awarding him the dependency exemption.
Second, Mr. Homer argues that it was an abuse of discretion
for the trial court not to consider amounts he voluntarily pays
toward support of children from his previous marriage in excess
of the court ordered child support in that marriage.
Finally, Mr. Homer argues that it was error to enter a child
support obligation in an amount that includes child care costs
when those costs will not be paid at some point in the future.
The Utah Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act governs
child support awards in the state of Utah.

The appropriate child

support worksheet was completed in this matter, and it has been
incorporated in the lower court's findings and conclusions.

This

worksheet includes the appropriate base combined child support
obligation calculated upon the parties' gross incomes.

The child

support tables in Utah Code Ann., § 78-45-7.14 (Supp. 1990) are
adjusted for FICA, federal and state taxes.

Therefore, contrary

to Mr. Homer's initial assertion that the court did not consider
the income tax consequences of the award, such consideration is
built into the process and the statute.
The other aspect of this issue is Mr. Homer's claim he
should have received the dependency exemption for the minor
child.

While state courts do have the authority to order a
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custodial parent to execute a section 152 declaration to allow a
non-custodial parent to claim a dependent as a tax exemption,
courts can do so only in narrow circumstances.

This was outlined

by the Utah Court of Appeals in Motes v. Motes, 786 P.2d 232
(Utah App. 1989).

The court pointed out that a specific finding

must be made that the award of the exemption financially benefits
the parties.

The Utah Court of Appeals stated:

Thus, use of the power to order a custodial
parent to execute a section 152 declaration
should not be used to evenly or otherwise
divide the available exemptions without
regard to the particular economic realities.
On the contrary, it should be limited to
those situations where the non-custodial
parent had the higher income and provides the
majority of support for the child or children
whose exemption is claimed — support at a
level which can be increased as a result of a
reduction in his or her tax burdens. Indeed,
it would be an abuse of discretion for a
divorce court to order a custodial parent to
sign the declaration in the absence of
appropriately supported findings to that
effect or demonstrating other exceptional
circumstances making it in the best interest
of the parties and their children that the
declarations be signed.
Id. at 239.

Applying this principle to the facts of this case,

Mr. Homer offered absolutely no evidence at trial that an award
of the exemption to him would economically benefit the parties or
that it would be in the best interest of the parties and their
minor child.

Not only is this contrary to the law as outlined in

Motes, a party cannot raise for the first time on appeal an issue
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not raised before the trial court.
P.2d 96, 99 (Utah 1986)).

(See Paffel v. Paffel, 732

Therefore, this aspect of Mr. Homerfs

argument is without merit.
Mr. Homer's next contention is that the trial court erred in
failing to give him credit for amounts he has paid toward support
of the children of his first marriage in excess of what h. was
ordered to pay.
statutory law.

This contention is directly contrary to express
Utah Code Ann., § 78-45-7.6 (Supp. 1990) states

as follows:
As used in the guidelines, 'adjusted gross
income' is the amount calculated by
substracting from gross income alimony
previously ordered and paid and child support
previously ordered.
At trial, Mr* Homer argued that, in addition to the $200.00 he
was ordered to pay, he was voluntarily paying his first wife an
additional $100.00 a month toward support of his children.

To

begin with, the lower court found, in Finding of Fact No. 14,
"that the defendant is presently ordered to pay $200 per month
support to the children of a prior marriage."

When Mr. Homer

objected to this finding on the basis that he paid amounts in
excess of amounts ordered, the trial court addressed that issue
in its Memorandum Decision dated October 26, 1989, and stated:
The court will not change the proposed order
with regards to child care expenses, nor will
non-ordered amounts of support paid to other
children be considered on the child support
obligation worksheet.
(R. 269). The court's resolution of the issue is consistent with
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the statute, and Mr. Homer's argument again has no basis in law.
Finally, Mr. Homer argues that the child support award as
entered fails to take into consideration the fact that
work-related child care costs will not continue to be incurred by
Mrs. Homer once the minor child reaches a certain age.

Once

again, this argument is expressly contrary to the statute.

Utah

Code Ann., § 78-45-7.16 (Supp. 1990) directly resolves Mr.
Homer's concern.

That statute states:

1. The monthly amount to be paid for
reasonable work-related child care costs
actually incurred on behalf of the dependent
children of the parents shall be specified as
a separate monthly amount in the order.
2. If an actual expense included in an
amount specified in the order ceases to be
incurred, the obligor may suspend making
monthly payment of that expense while it is
not being incurred, without obtaining a
modification of the child support order.
Thus, Mr. Homer has nothing about which to complain.

The

worksheet which is attached to the findings and conclusions
outlines his base child support obligation and his child support
obligation to be paid while work-related child care costs are
actually incurred.

Pursuant to the terms of the statute, when

those costs are no longer incurred, Mr. Homer will have no
obligation to pay the higher amount and must only pay the base
award.

Mr. Homer is an attorney and to have even raised this

issue on appeal without doing basic research into the law is an
abuse of the appellate process.
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All of Mr. Homer's arguments on appeal of his child support
obligation have no basis in fact or law.

Instead, the lower

court carefully considered the evidence before it and complied
with the law as outlined in the Uniform Civil Liability for
Support Act.

Therefore, Mr. Homer's support obligation should be

affirmed in all respects.
IV
THE
COURT'S
DIVISION
OF
PROPERTY, INCLUDING PENSION
FAIR AND EQUITABLE

THE
PERSONAL
BENEFITS, WAS

Prior to trial in this matter the parties had stipulated to
the division of all personal property except whether or not Mr.
Homer was entitled to an offset for the disparity in value of the
vehicles possessed by each party and the division of pension
benefits.

At trial, Mr. Homer argued that some of his pension

benefits were exempt from division and that others should be
valued as of the date of separation and not as of the date of
trial.

Finally, he argues that any award of benefits to Mrs.

Homer should be offset by the amount of his support of her
children during their marriage.
The court found that, despite the disparity between the
value of the parties' vehicles, the overall property distribution
was fair and equitable.

The court also divided equally all

pension and retirement benefits accrued during the course of the
marriage.

The court made the following finding:
9.

The Court finds that the parties did
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reserve for trial the issue concerning values
of the cars that each received. The
Defendant claimed to be entitled to an offset
because his car had a lower value. The Court
finds that the values of the cars are close
enough that no offset is required as part of
an overall equitable property settlement in
this case and confirms the award of the
automobiles as they existed at the time of
trial.
The only evidence before the trial court on the personal
property issue was Mrs. Homer's testimony and the Plaintiff's
Exhibit 10. (A copy of Exhibit 10 is included in the Addendum to
this brief as Exhibit B and by reference made a part hereof.)
Exhibit 10 sets forth the agreed upon division of the personal
property and the values of each.

Under that division, Mrs. Homer

was awarded personal property in the amount of $4,550.00, and Mr.
Homer was awarded personal property in the amount of $3,940.00—a
difference of approximately $600.00.

Mrs. Homer's evidence at

trial remained uncontroverted, and Mr. Homer put in no evidence
which would establish a different value for the cars or other
personal property.
Based upon the evidence, the overall division of property is
equitable.

Any issue of the values of the automobiles cannot be

considered in a vacuum without consideration of the entire
property distribution.
Mr. Homer also raised this issue in his objections to the
findings of fact.

The court responded in its Memorandum Decision

dated October 26, 1989, by stating that:
Defendant's objection to proposed finding # 6
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is an attempt to relitigate on the issues of
the respective of values of the cars awarded
to the parties. The Court will not change
it's [sic] determination regarding the cars
as it is a part of an overall equitable
property settlement.
(R. 269). Mr. Homer's appellate brief is yet another attempt to
relitigate the issues before the court on the division of
property.

The trial court, based on all the evidence before it,

made a fair and equitable division of the parties' personal
property which should be upheld on appeal.
Mr. Homer's second contention is that the trial court erred
in awarding Mrs. Homer one-half of the amounts accrued in all of
his pension and retirement accounts during the course of the
marriage.
1.

Mr. Homer claims this error is three-fold:
That the accounts should be valued as of the date of

separation and not the date of divorce;
2.

That the court's failure to make a specific finding as

to a dollar value of each account is reversible error; and
3.

That his pension benefits are a substitute for Social

Security and, since under federal law Social Security benefits
would be exempt in this case, these benefits should also be
exempt.
Contrary to Mr. Homer's assertions, the trial court's
division of pension and retirement accounts was appropriate and
strictly according to law.
At trial, each party presented evidence as to their
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retirement benefits accrued over the course of the marriage.

The

court addressed the division of these benefits in Findings of
Fact Nos. 18 and 19 which state:
18. The Court finds, as it relates to
retirement, that the Court will order that a
qualified domestic relations order be
prepared and submitted to the employers of
each of the parties. Each of the parties is
entitled to one-half of the retirement
programs of the other accrued during the
course of the marriage. This includes the
Defendant's pension account which he claims
is a substitute for social security. The
Court is now [sic] aware of any authority
which exempts this type of pension from being
divided as a marital asset. The only reason
social security is not divided is that
federal law expressly prohibits division.
This decision also includes division of the
retirement account which Defendant claims
belongs to West Jordan City.
19. Each of the parties is entitled to
one-half of the individual retirement account
and that distribution is ordered to be
effective immediately with both parties being
allowed to roll over the retirement account
into an account chosen by them.
In his objections to these findings, Mr. Homer argued that
the retirement account should be divided as of the date of
separation and that his pension was exempt from division.
250-251)

(R.

In response, in its Memorandum Decision dated October

26, 1989, the trial court stated:
Defendant's objection to proposed Finding #
18 is not well taken. Had the Defendant
wished to limit the Plaintiff's interest in
payments made to retirement programs during
the pendency of this litigation, he could
have moved for a bifurcated proceeding, and
could likely have ended the marriage shortly
after the action was filed. Plaintiff is
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entitled to a percentage of whatever
retirement benefits were accrued during the
time of entry into the marriage, and final
termination of the marriage through this
divorce action.
(R. 269)
Findings of Fact Nos, 18 and 19 are sufficient to support
the court's division of pension and retirement benefits and the
subsequent entry of the QDRO.
supported by case law.

In turn, these findings are well

To begin with, it is well established

that assets of a marriage are valued as of the date of the
divorce.

(See Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249 (Utah App. 1989).

This rule also applies to division of pension and retirement
benefits.
Second, there is no requirement in law that a trial court
make a specific finding as to a dollar value of a retirement
account or pension benefit.

To the contrary, in the case of

Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme
Court approved the award of a percentage of retirement benefits.
Third, Mr. Homer cites no law for his proposition that his
retirement benefits are exempt from division.

Instead, he seeks

to expand the exemption provided by federal law for Social
Security benefits to his pension account•

Not only Ls there no

support for such a position, it is indeed contrary to law.
Instead, as outlined by the Utah Supreme Court in Woodward,
supra., a trial court has broad power to consider all assets of a
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marriage, including pension benefits•

The Court stated:

In Enqlert v. Englert, Utah, 576 P.2d 1274
(1978), we emphasized the equitable nature of
proceedings dealing with the family, pointing
out that the court may take into
consideration all of the pertinent
circumstances. These circumstances encompass
'all of the assets of every nature possessed
by the parties, whenever obtained and from
whatever source derived; and that this
includes any such pension fund or insurance.1
To the extent that Bennett v. Bennett, supra,
may limit the ability of the court to
consider all of the parties' assets and
circumstances, including retirement and
pension rights, it is expressly overruled.
Id. at 432.

(quoting Englert, 576 P.2d at 1276).

Finally, Mr. Homer's argument that Mrs. Homer's award of
pension and retirement benefits should be reduced or offset by
the amounts he contributed for the support of her two children,
his stepchildren, is without merit.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-4.1

imposes a duty on parents to support their stepchildren during
the term of the marriage.

To expect to be reimbursed or credited

for such amounts if or when the marriage terminates is ludicrous
and would, in its practical effect, completely negate the
statutory duty imposed by § 78-45-4.1.

Such a result is contrary

to public policy and unsupported by law.
Therefore, all of Mr. Homer's arguments with respect to the
division of the parties' retirement benefits are wholly
unsupported by and contrary to current law.

His appeal of the

issue should be denied, and the trial court's ruling should be
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affirmed in all respects.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Homer's appellate brief fails to comply with the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the issues contained therein
have no basis in fact or law.

The form and substance of Mr.

Homer's brief are so inadequate that this Court should grant Mrs.
Homer's motion to strike and award her costs and fees incurred by
the necessity of defending against it.
The lower court's award of permanent alimony and child
support are supported by the evidence and the findings.

The

division of personal property, including pension benefits, is
fair and equitable and according to law.

The lower court's

decision should be affirmed in all respects.
Respectfully submitted this 25th day of September, 1990.

iVk,. rrox-^HELEN E. CHRISTIAN
KIM M. LUHN
Attorneys for
Plaintiff-Respondent
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I hereby certify that on this
day of September, 199 0,
I mailed, postage prepaid, four copies of the foregoing Reply
Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent to:
Stephen G. Homer
Pro Se
P.O. Box 493
West Jordan, Utah 84084
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ADDENDUM

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5

(1989).

Disposition of property —

Maintenance and Health care

of parties and children —

Court to have continuing

jurisdiction - - Custody and visitation

— Termination

of alimony^ __ Nonmeritorious petition for modification
(1)

When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court

may include in it equitable orders relating to the children,
property, and parties.
. . .

(2)

The court may include, in an order determining

child support, an order assigning financial responsibility
for all or a portion of child care expenses incurred on
behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the
employment or training of the custodial parent.

If the

court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and
that the dependent children would be adequately cared for,
it may include an order allowing the non-custodial parent to
provide the day care for the dependent children,
necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial
parent.
2.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-4.1

(1987).

Duty of a stepparent to support stepchild —

Effect of

termination of marriage or common law relationship.
A stepparent shall support a stepchild to the same

extent that a natural or adoptive parent is required to
support a child.

Provided, however, that upon the

termination of the marriage or common law relationship
between the stepparent and the child's natural or adoptive
parent the support obligation shall terminate.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.6

(Supp. 1990).

Adjusted gross income.
(1) As used in the guidelines, "adjusted gross income"
is the amount calculated by subtracting from gross income
alimony previously ordered and paid and child support
previously ordered.
(2)

The guidelines do not reduce the total child

support award by adjusting the gross incomes of the parents
for alimony ordered in the pending proceeding.

In

establishing alimony, the court shall consider that in
determining the child support, the guidelines do not provide
a deduction from gross income for alimony.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.16
Child care expenses —
(1)

(Supp. 1990).
Expenses not incurred.

The monthly amount to be paid for reasonable

work-related child care costs actually incurred on behalf of
the dependent children of the parents shall be specified as
a separate monthly amount in the order.
(2)

If an actual expense included in an amount

specified in the order ceases to be incurred, the obligor
may suspend making monthly payment of that
2

expense while it is not being incurred, without
obtaining a modification of the child support order•

PERSONAL PROPERTY LIST
ITEM
1981 Datsun 210
1983 Honda Accord
Waterbed
Color t.v.
Radial arm saw
Wing back chairs
Word processor
Refrigerator
Washing machine
13" t.v.
VCR
Waterbed
Shop tools
Dishwasher (replaced)
VCR
Disc player
Freezer
Picnic table
Plaintiff
Defendant

FMV

AWARDED TO

$1,200
4,000
50
75
100
75
700
600
40
150
250
300
500
150
100
100
75
25

Defendant
Plaintiff
Plaintiff
Plaintiff
Defendant
Plaintiff
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Defendant
Plaintiff
Plaintiff
Plaintiff
Defendant
Defendant

$4,550.00
3,940.00

EXHIBIT B

